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CRITICAL MASS AND THE PARADOX OF COLORBLIND 
INDIVIDUALISM IN EQUAL PROTECTION 
Elise C. Boddie∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Although it is the dominant paradigm in equal protection,1 color-
blind individualism bears little resemblance to the lived experiences 
of race.2  Within the colorblind individualist framework, race-
conscious selection policies presumptively violate equal protection 
because they place the racial group above the individual.3  And yet, a 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark.  B.A., Yale College; J.D., Har-
vard Law School; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  
For their comments and insights on earlier versions of this Article, I am grateful to 
Michelle Adams, Devon Carbado, Rachel Godsil, and Robin Lenhardt.  I also thank Linda 
Tropp for her research suggestions, in addition to the editorial staff of the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law and my research assistant, Cliff Dawkins.  In 
the interest of disclosure, I participated in drafting an amicus brief in the Supreme Court 
that was filed in support of the University of Texas in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.  
That brief advances some of the issues raised in this Article. 
 1 See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2002) (“It is now abundantly clear that a majority of the current 
Supreme Court views the Equal Protection Clause as a font of individual rights protection 
rather than as a safeguard for minority group interests.”); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1198 
(2000) (“[T]he central principles that characterize [colorblind individualist] discourse 
include the notions that individuals, and not groups, are the primary political units and 
bearers of rights . . . .”).  See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword:  
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 6 (1977) (contend-
ing that equal protection “presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be 
treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member” 
and, therefore, “presumptively forbids the organized society to treat an individual either 
as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant”); cf. Lani Guinier, 
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting:  A Case of Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1589 (1993) (discussing the liberal individualist critique of race-conscious voting leg-
islation on the grounds that it emphasized the group above individual rights). 
 2 See generally Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law:  How “Color Blindness” Dis-
course Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000) (exploring the 
role that “color blindness discourse” plays in legitimating and rationalizing racial stratifi-
cation). 
 3 Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1198; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (observing that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s 
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substantial body of social science points to the importance of racial 
minority groups for cultivating the “individuality” of the persons who 
comprise them.4  This research shows, for instance, that having a 
meaningful number of racial minorities in institutional settings can 
affect the likelihood that minorities in those institutions will perceive 
themselves, and be perceived by others, in individual terms.5 
This Article explores this connection between individuality—what 
I define here as the personal expression and growth that occurs in an 
environment free of tokenism, racial stereotypes, and stigma6—and 
the environmental presence of other people of color.  Contrary to 
the normative assumptions that underlie colorblind individualism in 
equal protection, using racial classifications as a tool for building ra-
cial groups in institutions can reduce the salience of race.7  Having a 
minority group presence creates a social context in which persons of 
 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat 
citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national 
class” (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995))) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Because the 
Fourteenth Amendment ‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’ all ‘governmental action based 
on race—a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and 
therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the 
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.’” (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (questioning “judicial protection against classifications based 
upon . . . racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal 
rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group”). 
 4 See Jay Rothman & Michal Albertstein, Individuals, Groups and Intergroups:  Theorizing About 
the Role of Identity in Conflict and its Creative Engagement, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 631, 
641 (2013) (“When outside forces, such as culture and community, have the most power-
ful shaping influence on an individual’s identity, then its social quality provides the most 
relevant perspective.”); Linda R. Tropp et al., The Use of Research in the Seattle and Jeffer-
son County Desegregation Cases:  Connecting Social Science and the Law, 7 ANALYSES SOC. 
ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 93, 101 (2007) (“Members of racial minority groups, who have long 
been subjected to racial stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination, are likely to encoun-
ter negative effects of racial categorization in their everyday lives.”); Lu-in Wang, Race as 
Proxy:  Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1067 (2004) 
(“Interactions in a range of such settings in which racial discrimination is a perpetual 
concern—such as employment, health care, and the criminal justice system—tend to be 
characterized by the presence of factors that promote behavioral confirmation and the 
absence of factors that might disrupt the process.”). 
 5 See infra Part II. 
 6 This definition tracks the Court’s interpretation of the equal protection guarantee in cas-
es adjudicating the constitutionality of racial classifications in affirmative action.  See, e.g., 
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (reaffirming that the purpose 
of equal protection is to avoid use of racial classifications that convey racial prejudice, ste-
reotypes and stigma); cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (identifying tokenism as one harm of low 
minority representation, which leads minorities to function as “spokespersons for their 
race”). 
 7 See infra Part II. 
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color are more likely to view themselves, and to be viewed by others, 
in terms that move beyond racial categories, consistent with equal 
protection’s normative goals.8  For racial minorities, therefore, 
achieving equal protection’s “colorblind” notions of individuality 
paradoxically depends on a racial predicate—that institutions race-
consciously seek to enroll racial groups that are large enough to min-
imize the significance of race.9 
This Article unpacks this paradox in the context of efforts to 
achieve a meaningful presence of underrepresented racial minority 
groups—referred to here as “critical mass”—in institutions of higher 
education.10  Higher education is a natural focus for this discussion 
because of the acknowledged role that critical mass plays in securing 
the educational benefits of diversity11 and because higher education is 
the site for continuing disputes about its constitutionality.12  Tracking 
Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,13 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger acknowl-
edged the role that critical mass could play in enriching the educa-
tional environment in colleges and universities.14  Yet in the recent 
case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the concept of critical 
mass has come under attack.15  Although the Supreme Court in Fisher 
endorsed diversity as a compelling state interest for purposes of high-
er education,16 the Court scarcely mentioned “critical mass” in its 
opinion,17 suggesting that the concept’s future may be uncertain. 
Thus, this Article builds on emerging scholarship on critical 
mass18 by contesting the commonly presumed tension between indi-
 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 See infra Parts II & III.A. 
 10 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–35 (2003). 
 11 See infra Part III.A. 
 12 See infra Part III.A.  
 13 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 14 539 U.S. 306, 329–31 (2003). 
 15 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 16 Id. at 2418 (“The attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values beyond race 
alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and 
stereotypes.”). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See, e.g., Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
97, 133–34 (2007) (observing that the creation of “critical mass” depends on empirical 
observation of the student body and the students’ interactions in a unique institutional 
context); Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1134 (2013) 
(discussing how a focus on intraracial diversity—namely, diversity focusing on the inter-
ests and types of individuals within a diverse group—may be succesfully used in the ad-
mission process and considering the potential consequences); Vinay Harpalani, Diversity 
Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. 
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vidualism and groupism.19  At bottom, my point is that our constitu-
tional analysis need not always choose between the two:  the former 
often depends on the presence of the latter and particularly so in the 
context of race.20  Moreover, acknowledging the areas of overlap be-
tween individual—and group—identity creates opportunities to ad-
vance narratives that situate race-conscious objectives within the con-
ventional equal protection framework.21 
Part I discusses colorblind individualism as the dominant para-
digm in equal protection, and the (wrongly) presumed tension with-
in this framework between individual rights and racial classifications 
that by definition rely on group categorizations.22  This Part lays the 
foundation for understanding how holistic university admissions poli-
cies that strive to create critical mass and intraracial diversity satisfy 
equal protection’s normative concerns.23 
Part II explores social science findings that erode the doctrinal 
basis for equal protection’s presumed conflict between individual 
rights and the use of race to achieve critical mass.  This Part contends 
that blindness both to racial groups and to the diversity within those 
groups paradoxically perpetuates the very stereotypes that equal pro-
tection condemns and can increase—rather than diminish—the sali-
ence of race. 
Part III explains how efforts to achieve critical mass through race-
conscious admissions in higher education can be reconciled with the 
objectives of colorblind individualism by alleviating the salience of 
race for individuals.  Part III.A begins by describing the origins of 
critical mass in Grutter and the dispute over critical mass more recent-
ly in Fisher. 
 
CONST. L. 463, 467 (2012) (contending “that diversity within racial groups is key to un-
derstanding the constitutionality of race-cosncious admission policies”). 
 19 See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights:  The Legacy of Brown, 
93 YALE L.J. 995, 1001 (1984) (identifying conflict between individualism and racial 
group orientation). 
 20 See John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit:  An Analysis of the Rhetoric 
Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 325 (1994) (“[R]elating to persons without 
regard to social relationships requires ignoring a significant part of their life and experi-
ence that makes them unique.”). 
 21 Cf. Harpalani, supra note 18, at 466–71 (reconciling the group concept of “critical mass” 
under equal protection doctrine). 
 22 Legal scholars have long explored the distinction in equal protection between individuals 
and groups.  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1, at 1100–09 (discussing the role of group iden-
tity in the formation of individual identity and behavior); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the 
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (urging a more robust 
acknowledgement of groups in equal protection in order to take “fuller account of social 
reality”).  
 23 See infra Part III. 
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Part III.B turns to the particular dimensions of critical mass.  Here 
I contend that critical mass can be conceived both in terms of the size 
of the minority student body as well as the kind of diversity within un-
derrepresented racial minority groups24 or “intraracial diversity.”  Be-
cause intraracial diversity depends on individual variation among 
persons of color, it aligns with equal protection’s normative emphasis 
on individuality.25  To illustrate this point, Part III discusses equal pro-
tection cases that reject stereotypical presumptions of the “sameness” 
of racial minorities.  These cases articulate norms of intraracial dif-
ferentiation that support the constitutional premise of intraracial di-
versity. 
In Part III.C, I contend that requiring the state to ignore race—in 
a context in which it has structured the lives of individual appli-
cants—may paradoxically violate the principles of colorblind individ-
ualism.  I conclude with some thoughts about how to operationalize 
critical mass through intraracial diversity and what it means for equal 
protection. 
I.  COLORBLIND INDIVIDUALISM IN EQUAL PROTECTION 
Equal protection presumptively rejects the use of race as a criteri-
on for government selection policies.26  The reasons for this stem 
from principles of colorblind individualism, which hold that the indi-
vidual—rather than the racial group to which she belongs—is the 
“primary political unit[] and bearer[] of rights.”27  The assumption is 
 
 24 See I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122 (2004) (“[C]ritical mass is not solely 
numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor 
on display, where one does not feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of 
being the designated representative for an entire group.”); Carbado, supra note 18, at 
1133–34 (observing the same, but raising concerns about the potential for racial typecast-
ing); Harpalani, supra note 18, at 468 (noting quantitative and qualitative aspects of criti-
cal mass); Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Catch Twenty-Wu?  The Oral Argument in Fisher v. Univer-
sity of Texas and the Obfuscation of Critical Mass, 107 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 216 
(2013) (arguing that critical mass “has both quantitative and qualitative elements”). 
 25 See Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher:  The Importance of Diversity Within Diversity, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/comme
ntary-on-fisher-the-importance-of-diversity-within-diversity (“These students advance the 
University’s educational mission by helping to defeat racial stereotypes that all minorities 
have experiences and perspectives that are functionally indistinguishable.”). 
 26 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to 
race-conscious affirmative action); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279–80 
(1986) (applying strict scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality of a provision in a col-
lective bargaining agreement for race-based protection against layoffs); Regents of Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (concluding that strict scrutiny applies to all ra-
cial classifications). 
 27 See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1198. 
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that using racial groups as an organizing principle for government 
policy leads to racial stereotypes and stigmatizes individuals on the 
basis of race.28  Such express considerations of race are further pre-
sumed to lead to racial balkanization, characterized by separateness 
and discord29 that distracts us from our shared individuality.30 
As conceived by the colorblind individualist, “equality” is a thin, 
formalistic concept that regards the relative disadvantage and oppor-
tunity differences between racial groups as largely irrelevant to equal 
protection.31  What matters instead is the state’s racially even-handed 
treatment of individuals as they pursue their respective visions of the 
good life.32  A central component of colorblind individualism is that 
the state “remain neutral among competing conceptions” of the good 
and not privilege any particular vision above another.33  Within this 
framework, individuals are presumed to be “fully self-determining, 
freely choosing subject[s].”34  The differences among individuals that 
invariably result from this unfettered choice are to be competitively 
resolved in the private sphere, without interference by the state.35 
Because the state is supposed to be agnostic about racial differ-
ences, race is deemed to be “irrelevant to the public self.”36  From this 
vantage point, race-conscious selection policies are constitutionally 
problematic because they require the state to referee contests among 
individuals on the basis of race.37  Conversely, the state’s “colorblind” 
refusal to take race into account in government decisionmaking 
 
 28 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (observing that 
“[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 
(noting that preferential programs based on race “reinforce common stereotypes holding 
that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a 
factor having no relation to individual worth”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29 See generally Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:  An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (observing that equal protection’s 
presumptive rejection of racial classifications reflects the Court’s concern about their im-
pact on “social cohesion”). 
 30 Id. at 1300 (“In prohibiting race-based civil rights initiatives, race conservatives are con-
ventionally understood as reasoning from the anticlassification principle concerned with 
threats to individualism, while race progressives who uphold affirmative action and other 
race-conscious civil rights initiatives are understood to reason about equality with atten-
tion to subordination or group status.”); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (discussing the balkanization critique as a form of “plural-
ism anxiety” that has transformed equal protection). 
 31 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310. 
 32 See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1197–1204. 
 33 Id. at 1198. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id. at 1199. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 1199–1200. 
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aligns with equal protection’s normative goals.38  Under the color-
blindness rubric, individuals compete against one another based on 
their personal characteristics and experiences, including the pur-
portedly “race-neutral” advantages and disadvantages that they have 
accumulated in the private sphere.39 
The primacy of the individual and the resulting conception of 
state neutrality help to explain the Supreme Court’s low tolerance for 
group-based distinctions in equal protection.  For instance, the Court 
has long rejected the cognizability of equal protection claims that are 
based solely on disproportionate adverse racial impact,40 and instead 
requires proof of discriminatory treatment against persons.41  This 
view presumes the irrelevance of racialized group disadvantage as a 
constitutional matter and emphasizes the importance of the individ-
ual to equal protection. 
The same normative assumptions that have led the Court to reject 
group inequality as an equal protection concern also animate its view 
that all racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, even if they are in-
tended to help racially disadvantaged groups overcome pervasive dis-
crimination.42  From the colorblind individualist perspective, whether 
a government program is designed to benefit or to burden persons of 
color is immaterial because equal protection should not permit the 
state to take account of differences among racial groups.43  Thus, the 
level of scrutiny under equal protection does not depend on a partic-
ular racial group’s status:  Any state consideration of race is subject to 
rigorous judicial review.44 
Here I turn to a key premise of colorblind individualism, which is 
that colorblind decisionmaking can in fact disassociate “the individu-
al” from her racial “group.”45  As Professor Reva Siegel has observed, 
this assumption depends in turn on the formalistic premise that “race 
is socially and morally irrelevant, a matter of appearance or skin color 
only.”46 
 
 38 Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1199–1200. 
 39 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (rejecting “racially disproportionate 
impact” as an equal protection violation unto itself). 
 40 See id. 
 41 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989). 
 42 See, e.g., id. at 493–94; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
 43 See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493–94; Pena, 515 U.S. at 222; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
 44 See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493–94; Pena, 515 U.S. at 222; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
 45 See Morrison, supra note 20, at 324–30 (critiquing this view). 
 46 See Siegel, supra note 2, at 88. 
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To unpack this further, let’s consider an admissions process at a 
selective public university.  As just discussed, under the colorblind in-
dividualist framework, the university would be prohibited from ex-
plicitly factoring race into admissions decisions.  We might imagine 
that it selects individuals instead based on their academic records, ex-
tracurricular activities, and teacher recommendations.  But no judg-
ment could be made about how that particular individual might “fit” 
into the overall racial composition of entering first year students.  
Within this paradigm, race makes no difference because it is pre-
sumed to be immaterial to the public self.47 
The mistake here lies in the premise that the state’s selection pro-
cess is actually “free” of race.48  Although the state does not explicitly 
rely on race in choosing among individual applicants, the effects of its 
“colorblindness” are hardly race-neutral.  Understanding this point 
requires some exploration of social science, which identifies a symbi-
otic relationship between the presence of racial minority groups and 
the development and expression of individuality for persons of col-
or.49  Without a critical mass of other people of color, racial minori-
ties are more likely to experience racial tokenism, stereotypes, and 
stigma.50  This racial dynamic undermines their ability to develop a 
sense of themselves beyond the context of being the racial “other.”51  
The resulting oppositional identity—which is borne from an experi-
ence of racial isolation and racial salience—inhibits the emergence of 
an individual identity that is less fully dependent on race.52  The 
state’s refusal on the front end to take account of race for purposes of 
building critical mass, in other words, has racial repercussions on the 
back end for the individualism of minority students in the university 
environment.53 
 
 47 See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1199 (“The solution [to social differences] . . . is 
accomplished by defining difference as irrelevant to the public self, the citizens, and rele-
gating it to the private.”). 
 48 Formally excising race from the admissions process fails to account for the ways in which 
race may unwittingly seep into an application—in part due to the difficulty that individual 
applicants may have denying or ignoring the formative role that race played to their per-
sonal experiences and identity.  See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial 
Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139 (2008) (discussing the practical and theoretical challeng-
es of racial “neutrality” in the admissions context). 
 49 See infra Part III. 
 50 See infra Part III.  
 51 See infra Part III.  
 52 See infra Part III.  
 53 See infra Part III.  But see Deirdre M. Bowen, American Skin:  Dispensing with Colorblindness 
and Critical Mass in Affirmative Action, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 375–77 (2011) (observing 
the benefits of critical mass but contending that institutions of higher education are min-
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The consequences of this not only can be felt by individual per-
sons of color, but also ripples across the institution itself.  The dimin-
ished sense of belonging and security can erode the willingness of ra-
cial minorities to engage in university life.54  As discussed below, this 
in turn undermines both the quantity and quality of interactions be-
tween white students and students of color.55  The result can be a self-
perpetuating cycle of awkward, racialized encounters that limit the 
appetite for future cross-racial interactions and/or leave both racial 
minorities and whites in a state of perpetual estrangement and mutu-
al distrust.56 
The critical point here is that state institutions are complicit in 
both the creation and maintenance of this racially compromised so-
cial architecture because colorblindness heightens social sensitivity to 
and awareness of race.  Thus, the state is not a neutral, racially impar-
tial decisionmaker as the colorblind individualist paradigm assumes, 
but rather is an instigator of racial mistrust and dysfunction.  The 
state’s efforts to deny race only make the problem worse.57 
As will be discussed in Part III, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
the limits of colorblind individualism in Grutter, which embraced the 
use of racial classifications for purposes of achieving critical mass in 
order to realize the educational benefits of diversity.58  Critical mass 
has come under attack recently, however, in Fisher.  Before we turn to 
Fisher though, we need to understand why having sufficient numbers 
of racial minorities helps to foster social conditions that mitigate the 
salience of race.  The next Part explores the social science research 
that underscores the importance of racial groups to individuality for 
persons of color. 
 
imally equipped to achieve the benefits of diversity, even with critical mass, where color-
blindness discourse dominates). 
 54 See infra Part III.  Deirdre Bowen observes the complexity of these dynamics and the po-
tential for interactions among diverse groups of students—who “carry different vestiges of 
status and power”—to run aground when they are not carefully managed.  See Bowen, su-
pra note 53, at 379–83. 
 55 See infra Part III. 
 56 See Bowen, supra note 53, at 379–83 (describing this dynamic). 
 57 Cf. Bowen, supra note 53, at 388 (“Colorblindness’s functionality as a way to minimize 
conflict and discomfort actually does the opposite.”); see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant 
Disguise:  An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 
1197, 1199 (2010) [hereinafter Bowen, Brilliant Disguise] (“Underrepresented minority 
students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal 
and external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.”). 
 58 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003). 
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II.  WHY RACIAL GROUPS MATTER 
This Part discusses social science research that explains the dy-
namic racial consequences of colorblind individualism.  This research 
erodes the important premise of colorblindness—that state action is 
necessarily racially neutral when it explicitly excludes race from a se-
lection process.  In fact, the state’s blindness to race can produce the 
very racial dynamics that equal protection purports to condemn by 
heightening the racial salience and visibility of persons of color in the 
subject institution.  On the other hand, state actors can mitigate the 
effects of racial difference by selectively taking race into account in a 
way that builds critical mass, thereby reducing the institutional visibil-
ity of persons of color and the associated problems of tokenism, ste-
reotype, and stigma.59  Properly understood, therefore, calibrated 
race consciousness, rather than enforced race neutrality, is more 
faithful to the objectives of equal protection.  This Part examines so-
cial science research to document how the sensitive acknowledge-
ment of racial groups can promote individuality and, conversely, how 
the absence of sufficient diversity, including intraracial diversity, di-
minishes persons of color. 
A. The Effects of Tokenism 
Let’s return to our purportedly colorblind admissions process.  
Assume that only 2% (or twenty) of the 1,000 students admitted to 
the first year class of a selective public university are African-
American.  The colorblind individualist views this as the happy con-
sequence of racial neutrality.60  From this perspective, because the 
state has not inserted race into the admissions process, the individual-
ity of the twenty black students was not compromised in any way:  
they were evaluated and admitted based solely on “who they are” as 
individuals, which is presumed to be wholly separate from their racial 
group identity.  Accordingly, the state has not stereotyped or stigma-
tized these students by using race as a factor in the selection process 
 
 59 Achieving these educational benefits also requires universities to take account of a status 
and power dynamic among racial groups that moves beyond the numbers.  Bowen, supra 
note 53, at 384–85 (observing that numbers alone “do not equate to social standing”).  
Bowen argues that such an outcome cannot be achieved through diversity if colorblind-
ness is the dominant paradigm.  Id. at 387–88 (“[D]iversity in a colorblind society creates 
invisibility . . . . It creates a schizophrenic environment in which race is consumed for ed-
ucation but otherwise ignored.”). 
 60 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–50 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that underrepresent-
ed minorities would be better off if they were denied admission to elite law schools than if 
they were admitted under race-conscious selection policies). 
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and, therefore, it has preserved its role as a racially-neutral arbiter of 
individual merit. 
Closer inspection of the racial dynamic that unfolds as a result of 
this admissions process, however, yields different insights.  It reveals 
that a number of the African-American students who were admitted 
declined to attend the “colorblind” institution, and chose instead to 
matriculate at another selective university that had a larger black 
population.61  It also shows that the students who did choose to attend 
feel racially isolated and alienated from their environment as a con-
sequence of their low numbers and the resulting high visibility of 
their race in their classrooms, their dorms, and in other social and 
academic spaces.62  These black students come to perceive themselves 
and are perceived by others as “the representative” of “the” African-
American experience.63  As a result, they suffer the harms of tokenism 
and the very racial stereotypes and stigma that they were supposedly 
spared under the “race neutral” admissions policy.64 
Research on gender tokenism suggests that low minority represen-
tation not only affects students of color, but can also lead to a range 
of negative downstream consequences for the institution as a whole.65  
Underrepresentation fosters divisions between racial “ingroups” and 
“outgroups” and leads individuals within each group to reciprocally 
stereotype and “otherize” persons on the basis of racial difference.66  
 
 61 See William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River:  Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 
39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 56 (2013). 
 62 Id. at 58. 
 63 See Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1234 (describing heightened stigma and 
racial isolation among minority students in anti-affirmative action states and the “open 
hostility” they face “[d]espite being admitted on purely white, normative admissions 
standards”). 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Eden B. King et al., Understanding Tokenism:  Antecedents and Consquences of a Psychologi-
cal Climate of Gender Inequity, 19 J. MGMT. 482, 484 (2010) (noting consequences of token-
ism in the context of work).  Cf. Mischa Thompson & Denise Sekaquaptewa, When Being 
Different is Detrimental:  Solo Status and the Performance of Women and Racial Minorities, 2 
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 183, 185–93 (2002) (discussing the negative impact of 
“solo status” on performance outcomes and observing that racial minorities’ “solo status” 
can lead to “overly cautious” styles of communication). 
 66 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:  Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Ac-
tion, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1275 (1998) (“Taken as a whole, research in social identity 
suggests that reducing the salience of intergroup boundaries can reduce intergroup bias, 
while increasing category salience can exacerbate it.”).  Professor Krieger observes that 
although racial preferences can exacerbate discrimination against racial outgroups, id. at 
1274–75, affirmative action can improve intergroup relations where it creates opportuni-
ties for students to develop multiple, “cross-cutting” identities.  See id. at 1275–76 (observ-
ing that where “structures provide opportunities for recategorizing members of otherwise 
distinct social groups. . . . [the] multiplication of potential categorical structures renders 
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Predictably, this increases intergroup anxiety, which itself leads to 
hostile or distrustful cross-racial interactions.67  Simply put, the failure 
to create racially inclusive and diverse environments is more likely to 
increase, rather than minimize, the significance of race.  Preserving 
the individuality of racial minorities thus first requires attention to 
their status as a group. 
To appreciate these points more fully, we start with a basic obser-
vation about the important constitutive role that racial group identity 
plays in the formation of individual identity.68  Henri Tajfel’s early 
work on social identity theorized that group membership is a funda-
mental component of an individual’s self-knowledge and awareness 
and that such membership carries “emotional value and signifi-
cance.”69  Social groups “fulfill a fundamental human need for social 
connectedness and serve as a primary source of individuals’ self per-
ceptions.”70  Individuals both conceive of themselves as members of a 
group71 and seek to attribute positive characteristics to themselves as a 
result of their group affiliation.72 
 
each less significant and thus less influential in intergroup perception, judgment, and 
behavior”). 
 67 See Frances E. Frey & Linda R. Tropp, Being Seen as Individuals Versus As Group Members:  
Extending Research on Metaperception to Intergroup Contexts, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 265, 272–73 (2006) (stating that intergroup anxiety exists where people feel “threat-
ened and uncomfortable” and concerned that others hold racially negative perceptions 
of them); see also Phillip A. Goff et al., The Space Between Us:  Stereotype Threat and Distance in 
Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 104 (2008) (discussing the role 
that the fear of appearing racist plays in heightening white anxiety in interactions with 
blacks, leading whites to “physically distance themselves” from blacks when they encoun-
ter a “racially contentious topic” in conversation). 
 68 See, e.g., Rothman & Alberstein, supra note 4, at 640 (“This self-perception assumes indi-
viduality, but even in its uniqueness, the self is seen as incorporating the larger context 
and existing in relationship with the other.”). 
 69 HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES 255 (1981). 
 70 See King et al., supra note 65, at 488 (“Social identity theory . . . suggests that individuals 
associate with others who are similar to them along meaningful dimensions . . . .”). 
 71 This does not mean that individuals necessarily see themselves solely in racial group terms.  
See TAJFEL, supra note 69.  Nor does this dynamic necessarily affect every person in the 
same way.  Rather,
,
 it describes a generalizable principle that challenges the default para-
digm of colorblindness in equal protection.  My point here is that empirical research sug-
gests that this default is the wrong one, particularly given the goals of individualism that 
underwrite the constitutional regime. 
 72 This racial self-conception is not necessarily internally consistent or uniform.  See Kenneth 
L. Karst, Myths of Identity:  Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 263, 284 (1995) (“This ‘white’ identity requires its bearers to suppress ‘the 
blackness within’ . . . .”). 
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Group identification and sorting is both a conscious and uncon-
scious human response.73  Indeed, “merely perceiving group distinc-
tions can propel biased evaluations, even in the absence of overt con-
flicts or structural inequalities.”74  Through cognitive processes 
individuals divide themselves and others into favored “ingroups” and 
disfavored “outgroups.”75  Ingroups can “powerfully enhance an indi-
vidual’s self-evaluation and self-conception.”76  Outgroups, on the 
other hand, are “homogenized, distanced and stereotyped.”77 
Racial group identification and sorting, therefore, are part of the 
human condition.  But these dynamics are exacerbated where racial 
minorities are underrepresented.78  Research on the effects of token-
ism in the gender context is instructive.  For example, Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter’s seminal studies on women in senior management positions 
revealed that tokenism enhanced perceived gender differences be-
tween men and women, creating greater social distance between the 
two groups.79  As a result, women felt pressured to conform to gender 
stereotypes80 and more “scrutinized,”81 were more distressed and al-
ienated from their work environments, and tended to operate within 
 
 73 See generally Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype:  Lessons from Cognitive Social Psycholo-
gy, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002) (explaining the role of stereotypes and unconscious bi-
ases in shaping perceptions of different racial groups); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing 
Through Colorblindness:  Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 469 (2010) (ex-
plaining that social cognitions can be both implicit and explicit).  
 74 Tropp et al., supra note 4, at 101–02. 
 75 See Michael A. Hogg, Intragroup Processes, Group Structure and Social Identity, in SOCIAL 
GROUPS AND IDENTITIES:  DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 67 (W. Peter Robin-
son ed., 1996). 
 76 Adams, supra note 1, at 1102. 
 77 Id. at 1101. 
 78 See King et al., supra note 65, at 488 (“[M]embers of social identity groups attend to their 
identities and relevant experiences, particularly in contexts in which their identities are 
salient.”).  Although the findings are not uniform, research indicates that persons of col-
or are more likely to experience racial discrimination where there is low minority repre-
sentation.  This suggests that underrepresentation may also influence whites’ perception 
and treatment of racial minorities.  Id. at 485  (“Empirical evidence also demonstrates 
that women and ethnic minorities are more likely to experience discrimination in con-
texts where they are underrepresented than in contexts that are more balanced.”).  With 
respect to gender, some research indicates that “social status, occupational deviance, and 
job prestige” may also influence “tokenism dynamics.”  Id. at 486; cf. Valerie Purdie-
Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies:  How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for Afri-
can Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 616 
(2008) (hypothesizing how environmental “cues” can trigger different racialized percep-
tions, including distrust and identity threat). 
 79 King et al., supra note 65, at 484. 
 80 Id. at 485. 
 81 Id. at 492. 
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a psychological schema that amplified the importance of gender.82  
These cumulative stressors “stifled emotional expression”83 and left 
women less likely to strive to “fit” into their organizations.84 
The same dynamics operate in the context of race.  For example, 
a study of racial perceptions of a corporate environment showed that 
having less employee diversity reduced African Americans’ level of 
trust toward “colorblind” policies which were intended to convey that 
race was “immaterial” to their institutional success.85  Conversely, 
where minority representation was high, African-American profes-
sionals “trusted the setting regardless of the stated diversity philoso-
phy.”86  In racially diverse environments, African Americans were 
more likely to regard a company’s professed colorblindness goals as 
benign and to feel a sense of comfort and belonging.87  Similarly, 
numerous studies confirm that the “solo status” of racial minorities—
in which they are “the only representative of [their] social catego-
ry”—weakens their performance along a range of indicators, even 
controlling for racial discrimination.88  Racial minorities in these con-
texts are likely to be perceived, and to perceive themselves,89 as racial 
tokens, which makes them the subject of unwanted attention and 
scrutiny that in turn dampens their success.90 
 
 82 Id. at 488 (“[A] woman whose gender identity is salient may be particularly attuned to 
dynamics she encounters that do not reflect positively on women; to the extent that wom-
en are tokens, gender-related issues will become salient and the organization will be per-
ceived through a gender-focused schema.”). 
 83 Id. at 484. 
 84 King et al., supra note 65, at 498, 503. 
 85 See Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (finding that when minority representa-
tion was low, minority individuals were more likely to distrust the colorblind policy); see 
also Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268 (“By virtue of being in the numerical minority, 
people sense that they are subjected to greater scrutiny as representatives of their groups, 
which contributes to a heightened awareness of group membership.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 86 See Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (“When minority group representation 
was high, participants trusted the setting regardless of whether the stated diversity philos-
ophy was colorblind or valuing diversity . . . .”). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 186 (“This suggests that some-
thing in the situational context impedes the expression of knowledge and skills in per-
formance for disadvantaged-group solos.”). 
 89 In group salient situations, people tend to stereotype both outgroups and their own 
ingroups.  They presume that ingroup members are more similar to them and that 
outgroup members are more different.  See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 270 (discuss-
ing how people in group salient situations make “assumptions of ingroup similarity and 
outgroup dissimilarity”). 
 90 See Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 185–86 (“[M]embers of disadvantaged 
groups working in White male-dominated environments report feeling isolated, receiving 
low responsibility positions and being showcased as representatives of their group . . . . 
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Understanding these dynamics requires an appreciation of the re-
lationship between the salience of racial groups and the size of those 
groups.  Low minority representation increases the salience of race 
for racial minorities while high minority representation minimizes 
it.91  This might make intuitive sense to anyone who has ever been in 
a situation where her social identity was visibly underrepresented.  
Women in an all-male environment are likely to be more cognizant of 
their gender.92  A person with a disability may be more aware of her 
physical limitations in a setting dominated by people who are not dis-
abled.93  Race works the same way.  However, because the opportunity 
for cross-racial interactions is generally low,94 the stakes that attend 
these interactions in particular institutional settings are necessarily 
higher and more consequential. 
Thus, having fewer numbers of racial minorities heightens sensi-
tivity and awareness of racial difference.95  On the other hand, having 
larger numbers tends to minimize the significance of race and to 
promote a sense of individuality among minority populations.96  Ap-
 
Because many avenues to raises and promotions are based on informal networks, [minor-
ity] solos may be left out of the loop, damaging their opportunities for advancement.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 91 See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. 
 92 See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 193 (“In addition to altering 
one’s expectations about an upcoming task, solo status can also increase awareness of 
one’s social identifications, i.e., racial and gender group memberships.”). 
 93 Research also suggests that the relative “salience” of people with disabilities in their envi-
ronment may lead non-disabled people to misperceive the actual abilities of disabled per-
sons.  See Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes”, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 523 (2002). 
 94 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“‘Racial and ethnic diversity is educationally important because, notwithstanding 
decades of progress, there remain significant differences in our lives and perceptions that 
are undeniably linked to the realities of race.  Continuing patterns of residential segrega-
tion, for example, mean that the daily events and experiences that make up most Ameri-
cans’ lives take place in strikingly homogenous settings.  As a result, most students enter-
ing college have had few opportunities for meaningful interactions across lines of race 
and ethnicity.  This separation . . . provides little opportunity to disrupt racial stereo-
types . . . .’” (citing Brief for Respondents at 11, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
(No. 02-516), reh’g granted en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007)); see also Christopher Ingraham, Three Quarters of Whites Don’t Have Any Non-white 
Friends, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/25/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-have-any-non-white-friends 
(commenting on the average person’s tendency to have friends predominantly of the 
same race). 
 95 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. 
 96 Id.; but see Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1233–44 (describing the complexity 
of interracial interactions and noting the importance of carefully managing them to 
achieve the benefits of diversity); Bowen, supra note 53, at 375–77, 386–91 (observing the 
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preciating this connection requires some additional understanding of 
how people categorize themselves.  Again, social science is instructive.  
It indicates that the degree to which a person thinks of herself in in-
dividual or group terms depends on how she thinks that others per-
ceive her, otherwise known as “metaperceptions.”97  People perceive 
themselves as individuals, or as racial group members, when they ex-
pect to be viewed as such by others.98  Critically, these individual and 
group identities are “‘functional[ly] antagonist[ic].’”99  This means 
that those who view themselves in individual terms are “less inclined 
to think of themselves in terms of their group memberships; con-
versely, when people think of themselves as group members, they are 
less likely to regard themselves as unique individuals.”100 
Colorblind individualists here assume that the use of racial classi-
fications in government selection policies necessarily makes race 
more consequential and leads people to think of themselves solely in 
racial terms.101  This view holds that relying on race to distinguish 
among various applicants gives race significance and status that 
should be unwarranted in a liberal democratic society which (at least 
theoretically) judges people by their individual merit.102  Indeed, in-
dividual Justices of the Supreme Court frequently contend as much 
in opinions that condemn the use of race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion.103 
The problem with these arguments is that they rest on a basic 
misunderstanding about the racial consequences of tokenism and the 
importance of building critical mass in order to construct environ-
ments in which students of color feel freer to cultivate and to express 
their individual identities.  Studies indicate that whether one catego-
 
difficulty of achieving diversity’s educational benefits where “colorblindness” discourse 
dominates the environment). 
 97 See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 265, 268 (defining metaperceptions as an “interest in 
what people think others think of them” and discussing factors that contribute to the de-
gree to which “people expect to be viewed as individuals or as group members”). 
 98 Id. at 268. 
 99 Id. (quoting JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP:  A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY 49 (1987)). 
100 Id. 
101 See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1287 (“[P]roponents of the anticlassification principle associ-
ate the rule against classifying by race with a value commonly associated with colorblind-
ness claims:  protecting individuals from the harm of categorization by race.”). 
102 See Morrison, supra note 20, at 330–34. 
103 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only 
because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, 
but also because every time the government . . . makes race relevant to the provision of 
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”). 
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rizes herself in terms of her personal or group identity significantly 
depends on the social environment.104  Once again, the level of mi-
nority representation in an institution is crucial:  it affects whether 
people “expect to be viewed as individuals” or as members of a racial 
group.105  People are most likely to think of themselves in racial group 
terms in tokenism contexts where the salience of racial groups is 
high.106  On the other hand, in social situations where group salience 
is low, individuals are more likely to “project their own views of them-
selves onto others.”107  In other words, low racial salience improves 
the chances that persons of color will perceive similarities between 
themselves and individuals who comprise other racial groups,108 lead-
ing to a shared appreciation of common interests and experiences 
across racial lines.  Putting this all together, having greater minority 
representation enhances the likelihood that individual persons of 
color will focus on their similarities with individual whites, while low 
representation leads them to dwell more on racial differences. 
To understand this further, let’s assume for a moment that a white 
student decides to attend an historically black college.  Being in a 
predominantly black environment, we might reasonably expect that 
he would become more aware of being white and that this awareness 
 
104 “Social identity theory” holds that identity operates on a personal and social level.  “Per-
sonal identity” focuses “on one’s individuating attributes,” or the characteristics that are 
distinct to people as individuals, while “social identity” focuses on “one’s group member-
ships.”  Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268.  See also id. (discussing “social identity theory” 
in the context of “self-categorization theory,” which “provid[es] a useful framework for 
understanding how and why different levels of self-categorization might emerge in differ-
ent social situations”). 
105 See id. at 267 (“[S]ituational and individual factors . . . might influence whether people 
expect to be viewed as individuals versus as group members.”). 
106 Id. at 268 (“[W]hen group membership is salient, people are more likely to think of 
themselves and others as group members, whereas when group membership is not sali-
ent, people are more likely [to] think of themselves and others as individuals.”); see also 
Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (discussing how low minority representation 
triggered concerns among African Americans that they would be “devalued due to racial 
identity”). 
107 Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 269. 
108 See id. at 269–70 (“[W]e expect that where there is an absence of cues to make group 
membership salient in the social context, people should generally tend to project their 
own views of themselves onto others.  However, as group memberships become increas-
ingly salient, we believe the bases of people’s metaperceptions should shift, such that they 
begin to make predictions about others’ views in terms of the perceived values, character-
istics, and attributes that define their groups.”).  Research, however, indicates that the ef-
fects of tokenism are diminished for individual members of socially dominant groups.  See 
King et al., supra note 65, at 485–86 (discussing the results of sociological research “exam-
ining the experiences of underrepresented individuals,” which suggested that “some to-
kens do not face . . . difficulties,” including male nurses who did not report feeling “more 
socially isolated than the women who dominated their occupation”). 
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would be different in both kind and degree than if he were enrolled 
instead at a predominantly white institution.109  We can also safely as-
sume that he would be the subject of some curiosity as a white person 
who stands out in a predominantly African-American environment.110  
He might even be stereotyped as a result of his whiteness, with some 
questioning his motives for attending a majority-black school.111 
The point here is that the size of the racial minority group is a fac-
tor in the production of racial stereotypes—both in terms of how one 
is viewed by his peers and in terms of how he views himself.112  Racial 
stereotypes are particularly acute for racial minorities in environ-
ments where there are few persons of color.113  For instance, minority 
faculty who teach at predominantly white institutions report that they 
are frequently stereotyped “as having interests only in minority af-
fairs,” which limits their exposure to other opportunities and damp-
ens their chances for advancement.114  As Claude Steele and others 
have persuasively demonstrated, concerns about being judged in ac-
cordance with prevailing stereotypes—commonly known as “stereo-
type threat”—undermines performance and achievement,115 a prob-
 
109 An interview of a white student who attended an historically black college discussed the 
dynamics of being racially visible in a minority-serving institution.  See Marybeth Gasman, 
Being White at a Black College:  An Interview, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2012, 7:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marybeth-gasman/being-white-at-a-black-college_b_
1713729.html. 
110 See id. (discussing the experience of being approached numerous times by students who 
wanted to know how he “felt being at [a historically black college] as a white guy, why 
[he] decided to attend, and what [he] thought about certain controversial topics related 
to race”).  But see Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 183–86 (noting that 
“members of privileged groups, such as Whites and males” tend to be less “debilitated” by 
their “solo status” in institutions). 
111 See Gasman, supra note 109 (discussing queries from other students about why he would 
choose to attend an historically black college and how it “felt being at a[] [Historically 
Black College or University] as a white guy”). 
112 Low institutional representation of persons of color can set a range of negative dynamics 
in motion that “perpetuate our tendency to perceive outgroup members in stereotypical 
terms.”  Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 273.  These “assumptions of ingroup similarity 
and outgroup dissimilarity may also lead one to expect that one’s true characteristics will 
be less transparent to outgroup members than to ingroup members.”  Id. at 270. 
113 See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 184–85 (discussing studies find-
ing weakened performance of racial minorities where they were “the only representative 
of [their] social category” in a given group). 
114 For a detailed discussion of these findings, see id. at 186. 
115 See Joshua Aronson et al., Stereotype Threat and the Academic Underperformance of Minorities 
and Women, in PREJUDICE:  THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE, 83, 84–86 (Janet K. Swim & 
Charles Stangor eds., 1998) (“The mere existence of such stereotypes poses for targets 
the additional risk of being seen and treated stereotypically . . . .  And, in situations where 
the stakes are high, [this threat] may cause enough distress to interfere with their per-
formance . . . of the activity.”); see also Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype 
Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
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lem that is compounded where minorities are underrepresented.116  
Creating an environment in which race matters less on the backend, 
therefore, requires institutions to develop a meaningful minority 
presence on the front end. 
B.  The Anti-Balkanizing Benefits of Positive Intergroup Contact 
Social science demonstrates the importance of positive intergroup 
contact to reducing racial stereotypes and stigma.117  Gordon Allport’s 
early “contact hypothesis” theorized that intergroup interactions be-
tween people from different racial backgrounds could reduce social 
prejudice.118  His hypothesis has since evolved “into a full-blown theo-
ry of considerable complexity.”119  However, a significant body of work 
validates Allport’s original findings that positive intergroup interac-
tions alleviate anxiety and fear of other groups and increase social 
empathy, which improves relations among groups.120 
That said, intergroup contact is not sufficient by itself to generate 
positive cross-racial interactions.  The simple presence of different 
racial groups can heighten sensitivity to racial differences,121 because 
 
PSYCHOL. 797, 807–10 (1995) (examining studies focusing on “stereotype threat”, which 
showed that “making African American participants vulnerable to judgment by negative 
stereotypes about their group’s intellectual ability depressed their standardized test per-
formance . . . while conditions designed to alleviate this threat, improved their perfor-
mance . . . .”). 
116 See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65 (discussing various studies indicat-
ing that performance may suffer in situations where minorities find their group un-
derrepresented). 
117 Other factors contribute to the group salience of race.  For example, the “mere presence 
of an outgroup member,” conflict between racial groups, and stigmatized identity can in-
crease the salience of race.  See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268–69. 
118 See Thomas F. Pettigrew et al., Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory, 35 INT’L J. 
INTERCULTURAL REL. 271, 272 (2011) (discussing recent advances in social psychology re-
garding intergroup contact, including Allport’s “contact hypothesis”). 
119 Id.  For a discussion of some of the nuances of the theory of positive “interracial contact 
and its beneficial outcomes,” within the context of schoolchildren in integrated schools, 
see generally Tropp et al., supra note 4, at 107–08. 
120 For example, Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp determined that, out of 515 studies 
addressing intergroup contact’s effect on reducing prejudice, 94% reported that “greater 
contact is routinely associated with less prejudice.”  See Pettigrew et al., supra note 118, at 
274.  But see Blasi, supra note 73, at 1247–50, 1279 (arguing that the contact hypothesis is 
“wildly overoptimistic” because only under “very limited, often counterintuitive condi-
tions” does contact with outgroup members have any positive effect on stereotyping). 
121 See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268 (“[T]he mere presence of an outgroup increased 
people’s tendency to categorize themselves and others in terms of group membership, 
such that they assumed greater similarities between themselves and other ingroup mem-
bers and perceived greater differences between themselves and outgroup members.”); see 
also Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1233–44 (observing the complexity of in-
teractions among diverse groups of students). 
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people tend to view members of their own “ingroup” more positively 
than people outside their group.122  In these situations, individuals are 
more likely to perceive similarities between themselves and other 
members of their ingroup and greater differences with individuals 
from outside their group.123 
This brings us back to the importance of a healthy racial minority 
presence for achieving positive interracial contact.  The greater the 
size of the racial minority group, the more likely it is that individual 
members of that group will feel the kind of institutional belonging 
and trust that leads them to engage with white students.  Low minori-
ty presence, on the other hand, generates a perception—both for in-
dividual minorities and their white peers—that students of color are 
“representatives of their [races].”124  This context raises the stakes of 
cross-racial interactions, and—because of the attendant anxiety for 
both groups—can produce “unwitting” negative, non-verbal behav-
iors,125 such as “decreased eye contact, greater social distance, and in-
creased fidgeting and hesitant speech.”126  Because individuals in both 
groups fear that they are being evaluated negatively as a result of the-
 
122 Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 270.  Indeed, as Michelle Adams has observed, among the 
worst possible outcomes of intergroup contact is competition and conflict that locks in 
the intergenerational, structural advantages that whites have over blacks in particular.  See 
generally Adams, supra note 1, at 1109–21 (analyzing the “process by which [blacks and 
whites] compete” for economic and social advantage and the unequal “social structure” 
that results from this competitive behavior). 
123 See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268 (discussing studies which found that individuals in 
situations where an outgroup member was present “assumed greater similarities between 
themselves and other ingroup members and perceived greater differences between them-
selves and outgroup members”). 
124 See Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 193 (“Research indicates that solos of-
ten feel as if they are seen as representatives of their entire group.”).  Having strong 
group identification can also lead people to emphasize racial salience.  See Frey & Tropp, 
supra note 67, at 269 (“[G]reater levels of [group] identification should lead people to 
not only see themselves as group members but also expect to be seen by others in terms 
of their group membership.”). 
125 See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 273 (describing this phenomenon). 
126 Id.  Nevertheless, “people will likely continue to be aware of differences between their 
groups and expect to be perceived as group members, even when attempts are made to 
reduce the salience of group membership,” though “reductions in group membership sa-
lience . . . could potentially improve metaperceptions among individual members of dif-
ferent groups.”  Id. at 274.  On the other hand, positive cross-racial interactions can have 
a lasting constructive impact.  For instance, a study of racial “friendship networks” ob-
served that black students even on diverse campuses expected white students with all-
white social networks to perceive them negatively.  See Daryl A. Wout et al., When Your 
Friends Matter:  The Effect of White Students’ Racial Friendship Networks on Meta-Perceptions and 
Perceived Identity Contingencies, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1035, 1039 (2010).  
However, black students expected more comfortable interactions with white students who 
had racially diverse groups of friends, which, in turn, made them more likely to interact 
with those white students.  See id. at 1039–40. 
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se unpleasant exchanges, they tend to respond by negatively judging 
individuals from the opposite group.127  The result is a spiral of 
“avoidant behaviors and attitudes,” with lasting effects for individuals 
in both racial communities128 as students of color and whites isolate 
themselves from the other, leading to the very “balkanizing” effect129 
that equal protection condemns. 
To put this in practical terms, consider what it might be like for a 
handful of African-American students at a predominantly white 
school.  Their small numbers (combined with the limited experience 
that most white students have interacting with blacks)130 makes cross-
racial interactions awkward and uncomfortable and, therefore, infre-
quent.  This leads to even greater social distance between whites and 
blacks on campus and further weakens black students’ social ties to 
the institution.  As a result of their social isolation, black students 
come to view themselves as institutional outsiders and withdraw from 
university life, which limits their personal development and growth.  
Because they experience the university as racial “others,” they lose the 
opportunity to cultivate their sense of personhood and, thus, their 
individuality in a way that is more independent of their minority sta-
tus. 
Appreciating these group dynamics helps us to understand the 
source of racial stigma.131  Opponents of affirmative action commonly 
 
127 See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 272–73 (discussing the effects of expecting to be 
viewed negatively by outgroup members). 
128 See Goff et al., supra note 67, at 91–92 (discussing the contribution of “avoidant behaviors 
and attitudes” to “intergroup distancing”); Wout et al., supra note 126 at 1035–36, 1039–
40 (noting that people’s expectations that outgroup members “will perceive them nega-
tively can have serious negative consequences,” and discussing studies demonstrating that 
when black students encountered white students with racially homogenous friend groups, 
those black students “expected [the] White student . . . to perceive them more negative-
ly,” and, in turn, “expected more interpersonal challenges during the upcoming interac-
tion with this [white] student”). 
129 Researchers describe the “possible judgments, stereotypes, opportunities, restrictions, 
and treatments that are tied to one’s social identity” as “social identity contingencies.”  See 
Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 615. 
130 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 
2004) (citing Brief for Respondents at 11, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-
516)), reh’g granted en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (not-
ing how many students have had few interactions with individuals of other races and eth-
nicities prior to college); Ingraham, supra note 94 (discussing data which showed that “a 
full 75 percent of whites have ‘entirely white social networks without any minority pres-
ence.’ . . . [And t]he same holds true for slightly less than two-thirds of black Ameri-
cans”).  
131 See R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 803, 809 (2004) (describing “racial stigma” not as “racial slurs or insults, stereo-
types, or even the denial of a particular opportunity,” but as “a problem of negative social 
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argue that its beneficiaries feel stigmatized by race conscious policies 
and that the elimination of affirmative action would make students of 
color more receptive to institutions that have abolished it.132  However, 
studies point to a different conclusion—that low minority representa-
tion is a more likely source of racial stigma.133  For example, a study of 
enrollment patterns among students of color who had been offered 
admission to colleges within the University of California system fol-
lowing the ban on race-conscious admissions under the state constitu-
tion illustrated that higher-achieving minority students were less likely 
to enroll in the more elite state institutions with low minority repre-
sentation.134  This finding corroborated conclusions from other stud-
ies135 that low minority representation signaled to admitted students 
of color that they would be more isolated and less welcome, making 
them more distrustful of the institution and less likely to enroll.136  
Conversely, higher minority representation at elite institutions that 
were not affected by the state ban led to higher minority enroll-
ment.137  Again, this comports with our understanding of the impact 
of critical mass.  Minority students are more likely to perceive that 
they are respected by their peers and to feel institutional belonging 
where they have a meaningful on-campus presence.  Because they are 
less visible and less tokenized, they are less likely to experience racial 
stigma.138 
The lesson here is that the size of the minority presence in institu-
tional settings matters.  It cues perceptions of the environment that 
in turn determine whether students of color will engage with the 
broader campus community or will “bunker” in the relative safety of 
their own groups.139  Although size alone does not guarantee institu-
 
meaning,” which “involves becoming a disfavored or dishonored individual in the eyes of 
society, a kind of social outcast whose stigmatized attribute stands as a barrier to full ac-
ceptance into the wider community”). 
132 See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004) (identifying the “costs” of affirmative action as the “stigma 
and stereotypes that might result from differential admissions standards”). 
133 See Kidder, supra note 61, at 55; Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57. 
134 See Kidder, supra note 61, at 84. 
135 See Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (discussing how low minority representa-
tion in non-educational settings, such as corporations, leads African Americans to “ex-
pect[] to be passed over for promotions, feel[] excluded from social events, and feel[] 
that their race would be relevant to how others view them”). 
136 Cf. Kidder, supra note 61, at 78–79. 
137 Id. 
138 Cf. id. at 69. 
139 Id.; see, e.g., Goff, supra note 67, at 105; Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 615; Linda 
R. Tropp et al., How Peer Norms of Inclusion and Exclusion Predict Children’s Interest in Cross-
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tional success, social science strongly indicates that it is an essential 
precondition for healthy racial dynamics.  However, achieving minor-
ity presence requires attention in the first instance to admitting and 
enrolling students of color and then to promoting conditions for pos-
itive interactions between racial groups once they are on campus.140  
This necessarily depends on a degree of race-consciousness and the 
use of tools that are explicitly oriented to these goals. 
III.  RECONCILING RACE & INDIVIDUALITY IN EQUAL PROTECTION 
Part I discussed equal protection’s paradigm of colorblind indi-
vidualism, which is hostile to government selection policies that dis-
tinguish individuals on the basis of race.  Part II explored social sci-
ence research that explains the importance of minority presence in 
predominantly white institutions to the individuality of persons of 
color.  The absence of a critical mass of racial minorities increases the 
visibility of persons of color and heightens the salience of race.  It al-
so reduces the likelihood of healthy cross-racial interactions that ena-
ble people to perceive each other in terms that move beyond racial 
categories.  The important point here is that the goal of achieving 
critical mass is consonant with the objectives of colorblind individual-
ism because it reduces the visibility of race and the associated harms 
of tokenism, thereby promoting opportunities for the individual 
growth of people of color. 
This Part discusses Grutter v. Bollinger, which reconciled the ten-
sion between the use of racial classifications and individual rights 
through the concept of critical mass.  It then discusses the rationale 
for intraracial diversity as a component of critical mass through the 
lens of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. 
A.  Grutter, Fisher & Critical Mass 
As discussed in Part I, equal protection is conventionally suspi-
cious of distinctions based on racial groups and, therefore, presump-
tively rejects state interests that depend on producing certain “num-
bers” of racial minorities.141  In Grutter v. Bollinger, however, the 
 
Ethnic Friendships, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 151 (2014) (discussing the important role of perceived 
peer values for encouraging cross-ethnic friendships); Wout, supra note 126, at 1037–40.  
140 See Bowen, supra note 53, at 386–92 (observing that “colorblindness” discourse under-
mines diversity benefits); Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1233–44 (noting the 
need to manage interracial dynamics in order to achieve diversity benefits).  
141 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (observing that equal pro-
tection guarantees its protections to “individuals”). 
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Supreme Court reconciled the presumed tension between groups 
and individuality through its endorsement of critical mass in the con-
text of higher education admissions.142  There the Court upheld a 
race-conscious admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law 
School after concluding that it was narrowly tailored to the school’s 
compelling interest in securing “the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body.”143  The hallmark of the plan was its limited, holistic use 
of race that was flexibly applied to ensure “truly individualized con-
sideration.”144 
Acknowledging the harms of low minority representation, the 
Court also endorsed the law school’s individualized use of race to 
produce a critical mass of persons of color.  Achieving a “‘critical 
mass’” of underrepresented minorities promoted the law school’s 
educational mission by “help[ing] to break down racial stereotypes”145 
and diminishing the individual harms of tokenism.  Enhancing the 
size of racial minority groups, in other words, (paradoxically) dimin-
ishes the salience of race.  As framed by Grutter, therefore, the objec-
tives of critical mass align with the normative underpinnings of 
colorblind individualism in equal protection. 
The question of how to define the constitutional parameters of 
critical mass with greater particularity surfaced more recently in Fisher 
v. University of Texas at Austin.  Fisher challenged the University of 
Texas’s race-conscious undergraduate admissions policy, which 
sought to build critical mass by enhancing diversity within the racial 
minority population itself.146  Texas law requires the University to ad-
mit all public high school students who graduate in the top ten per-
cent of their class.147  Because significant residential segregation in 
the state produces racially segregated high schools, the law ensures 
some level of racial diversity on campus.148  But the University deter-
mined that the source of that diversity—racially segregated neigh-
borhoods and schools—“systematically hinder[ed] [its] efforts to as-
semble a class that is broadly diverse, and academically excellent, 
 
142 539 U.S. 306, 335–36 (2003). 
143 Id. at 333. 
144 Id. at 334. 
145 Id. at 329–30 (citing Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539. U.S. 306 (2003) 
(No. 02-241)). 
146 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 653–54 (5th Cir. 2014) (“UT Austin per-
suades that . . . reach[ing] into the applicant pool is[] . . . a search for students of unique 
talents and backgrounds who can enrich the [student body’s] diversity . . . .”) 
147 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 2011). 
148 Fisher, 758 F.3d at 650–51 (“The sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan gains diversity 
from . . .[t]he de facto segregation of schools in Texas . . . .”) 
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across the board[,] including within groups of underrepresented mi-
norities.”149  Therefore, it supplemented the ten percent plan with an 
admissions policy that allowed a student’s race to be evaluated in the 
context of his or her lived experiences.150  Importantly, race was not 
necessarily a factor in the assessment of any individual applicant under 
the policy; rather, its consideration depended on the relative salience 
of race to the student’s identity or background.151 
Admissions data demonstrated that this individualized component 
of the University’s admissions policy increased intraracial diversity 
among underrepresented minority groups—specifically, that African-
American and Latino students admitted at this stage of the process 
were “on average, more likely than their top 10% counterparts to 
have attended an integrated high school[,] . . . less likely to be the 
first in their families to attend college[,] tend[ed] to have more var-
ied socioeconomic backgrounds; and, on average, [had] higher SAT 
scores than their top-10% counterparts.”152  The University pointed to 
“the great potential” these students had for “bridg[ing]” racial divides 
on campus by “promoting cross-racial understanding, as well as in 
breaking down racial stereotypes,” particularly stereotypes that may 
have been reinforced by the Top 10% plan.153  By “increasing diversity 
within diversity[,]” the University could dispel stereotypes that all ra-
cial minorities share the same backgrounds, experiences, and per-
spectives.154 
Thus, in fashioning its policy, the University sought to recognize 
the individuating characteristics of students of color.155  But the plain-
tiff in Fisher argued that the ten percent plan admitted sufficient 
numbers of African Americans and Latinos to satisfy the University’s 
diversity-based educational objectives.156  According to the plaintiff, 
the University could not constitutionally factor race into a separate 
admissions process—even in ways that were designed to acknowledge 
 
149 Brief for Respondents at 33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 
11-345) (emphasis in original). 
150 Fisher, 631 F.3d at 228. 
151 Id. 
152 Brief for Respondents, supra note 149, at 33–34; see also Fisher, 758 F.3d at 653 (observing 
that the Top Ten Percent Plan’s holistic review policy “was a necessary and enabling 
component . . . to reach a pool of minority and non-minority students with records of 
personal achievement, higher average test scores, or other unique skills”). 
153 Brief for Respondents, supra note 149, at 34. 
154 Id. 
155 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 654 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the 
University’s “holistic use of race in pursuit of diversity is not about quotas or targets, but 
about its focus on individuals”). 
156 Id. at 644–45. 
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individual differences within the racial group itself as a component of 
critical mass.157  The plaintiff’s contention framed the University poli-
cy through the lens of colorblind individualism—that seeking to 
achieve intraracial diversity simply aggrandizes, rather than diminish-
es, the salience of race.158 
Fisher’s litigation position exposes yet another dimension of the 
“colorblindness” paradox:  the failure to acknowledge individual vari-
ation within underrepresented racial groups entrenches presump-
tions of racial “sameness” that equal protection routinely rejects.159  
Intraracial diversity, on the other hand, aligns with the normative 
underpinnings of colorblind individualism.  Drawing distinctions 
among people of color promotes the individualization of their identity.  
It necessarily reduces the salience of race because its whole point is 
that not all persons of a particular racial background are alike.160  It 
rejects as a matter of principle the presumed “sameness” of persons 
of color. 
As of this writing, Fisher’s future—and the future of critical mass—
is uncertain.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher two terms ago 
omitted any substantive reference to critical mass.161  Instead, it vacat-
ed the court of appeals judgment upholding the University of Texas 
policy and remanded on the grounds that the lower court had not 
appropriately applied a narrow tailoring analysis.162  On remand, the 
court of appeals upheld the policy163 for a second time, setting the 
stage for a potential return to the Supreme Court.164  The sections be-
low further explore why critical mass aligns with the objectives of 
colorblind individualism and why the Court should continue to em-
brace critical mass.  As discussed below, critical mass can assume both 
 
157 Id. at 644. 
158 Id. at 645 (observing the argument by the plaintiff in Fisher that UT’s admissions policy 
was “no more than an exercise in gratuitous racial engineering”). 
159 See infra Part III.B. 
160 See infra Part III.B. 
161 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013). 
162 Id. at 2415.  The court of appeals initially upheld the University’s policy, but deferred to 
the University’s “presumably expert academic judgment” about whether it had “attained 
critical mass” or whether race-conscious efforts were still necessary to reach that objective. 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011). 
163 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming district 
court’s judgment for the University). 
164 Daniel Fisher, Fisher vs. Texas Dismissed Again; Is It Headed Back to Supreme Court?, FORBES 
(July 15, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/07/15/fisher-
vs-texas-dismissed-again-is-it-headed-back-to-supreme-court (suggesting Fisher’s intention 
to seek Supreme Court review of court of appeals decision). 
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a quantitative as well as a qualitative dimension that promotes indi-
viduality165 in keeping with equal protection’s normative frame. 
B.  Intraracial Diversity & Differentiation Norms 
Below I discuss Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, which 
embraced intraracial diversity explicitly in the context of higher edu-
cation—both for white students and for students of color.166  I then 
move on to cases outside the higher education context that focus on 
norms of intraracial difference.  I refer to these as “differentiation 
norms.”167  Differentiation focuses on the individuating characteristics 
among members of different racial groups.  Bakke and the rest of the-
se cases support the constitutional premise of intraracial diversity. 
1. Higher Education 
The Court’s endorsement of intraracial diversity begins with Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.  As is well known, Bakke involved an 
equal protection challenge to the admissions policy at the University 
of California at Davis Medical School.  UC Davis operated a two-tier 
admissions track, one that was open to all applicants and a second 
track that reserved a fixed number of seats for minority applicants.168  
The Court struck down the admissions policy, but in a separate opin-
ion, Justice Powell concluded that a more refined consideration of 
race, one which was designed to realize the educational benefits of 
student diversity, could pass constitutional muster.169  According to 
Justice Powell, the constitutional harm of the UC Davis policy was its 
quota system, rather than its consideration of race per se.170  The 
problem with the policy as designed was that it precluded white ap-
plicants from competing with the University’s racially disadvantaged 
applicant pool.171  By setting aside a fixed number of seats for racial 
minorities and insulating minority applicants from holistic review, 
 
165 Here I should be explicit that promoting individuality does not mean that race ceases to 
be a part of a person’s identity—only that creating a meaningful minority presence in in-
stitutions of higher education can help liberate students of color to develop their indi-
vidual identities both within and outside their racial group. 
166 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 316–24 (1978).  
167 See also Carbado, supra note 18, at 1135 (discussing “differentiation”). 
168 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276 (1978). 
169 Id. at 315–19. 
170 Id. at 316–20. 
171 Id. at 318 n.52 (“The denial [to Alan Bakke] of this right to individualized consideration 
without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions pro-
gram.”). 
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race had too decisive an impact.172  This violated a fundamental tenet 
of equal protection that placed the individual at the center of its do-
main.173 
On the other hand, a policy that used race as a simple “plus” fac-
tor, to be weighed along with other dimensions of each applicant, was 
different.  As Justice Powell explained, this kind of racial considera-
tion “treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions pro-
cess.”174  Justice Powell reasoned further that an applicant who is de-
nied admission under such a process would not have been foreclosed 
from competitive consideration and, therefore, would have no consti-
tutional grievance. 175  Race-sensitive admissions policies faithfully ad-
hered to equal protection’s focus on individual, as opposed to group, 
rights.176 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion formed the basis for the Court’s lat-
er decision in Grutter that an individualized, race-conscious admis-
sions policy satisfies equal protection.177  However, an often over-
looked portion of Justice Powell’s opinion also fully ratified the 
principle of intraracial diversity as a logical extension of diversity’s 
educational benefits. 178  Diversity had long been a tenet of the Har-
vard College admissions process that Justice Powell endorsed as a 
model for constitutional consideration of race.  But he noted that di-
versity had been limited to “students from California, New York, and 
Massachusetts, city dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and 
football players; biologists, historians and classicists; potential stock-
brokers, academics and politicians,” with “few ethnic or racial minori-
ties.”179 
In other words, intraracial diversity among white students had 
long been an institutional norm at Harvard.  Admissions officers 
there well recognized that a “farm boy from Idaho” could contribute 
something different to Harvard College “that a Bostonian [could] not 
offer.”180  Higher education had accepted the premise that admissions 
 
172 Id. at 317–18. 
173 Id. at 298–99. 
174 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978). 
175 Id. at 318.  See also id. at 319 (“So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, 
case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process.”). 
176 Id. 
177 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539. U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (“Since this Court’s splintered decision in 
Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the 
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”). 
178 Id. at 324. 
179 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322. 
180 Id. at 323. 
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policies should evaluate the different experiences of white students in 
determining whom to admit.  Justice Powell simply sought to apply 
the same principle to students of color. 181 
For instance, the Harvard College admissions plan that Justice 
Powell endorsed observed that “the child of a successful black physi-
cian in an academic community with promise of superior academic 
performance” and a lower income black child who grew up in the in-
ner city and demonstrated “energy and leadership” had different ex-
periences and perspectives that could each uniquely contribute to the 
educational environment.182  An admissions officer could constitu-
tionally weigh these respective experiences in deciding whether to 
admit either (or both) applicants.  The “critical criteria,” Justice Pow-
ell noted, “are often individual qualities or experience not dependent 
upon race but sometimes associated with it.”183  His point was that 
higher education can constitutionally distinguish among individuals 
in ways that account for the relative salience of race to their lived ex-
periences. 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion underscores an important point 
that has been lost in the debate over race-conscious admissions poli-
cies:  white students in predominantly white institutions enjoy a pre-
sumption of intraracial diversity.  This is in part a function of the rela-
tive size of the white population, but is also the product of a 
conscious effort by universities to embrace diversity across a broad 
spectrum.  As a result, white students are freer to develop their indi-
viduality without the stereotype constraints of “racial roles.”  Indeed, 
the number and diversity of white students in predominantly white 
institutions is so extensive that we commonly fail to acknowledge 
whites in terms of their group status.184  Both the vastness of their 
group—and the individual differentiation within it—diminish the sa-
lience of their race.185  Accordingly, we have come to take diversity 
among white students for granted.  Policies like those at issue in Fisher 
simply seek to extend the same benefits to students of color. 
 
181 Id. at 324. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and the Requirement 
of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.REV. 953, 957 (1993) (describing whites’ general lack 
of “white consciousness”); cf. Gasman, supra note 109 (discussing white student’s unique 
experience attending a predominantly black college). 
185 Id. 
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2.  Political Participation & K-12 Education 
In contexts outside higher education, the Court has embraced 
intraracial diversity as a constitutional norm by striking down race-
conscious policies that obscure individual differences within minority 
populations.186  In each of the cases discussed below, the Court starts 
with a presumption of intraracial differentiation and rejects those 
classifications that perpetuate false notions of “sameness” among in-
dividual persons of color.  Because these classifications elevate racial 
groups above the individual members of those groups, the Court de-
termines that they run afoul of equal protection’s command that 
“[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of 
the laws.”187 
Shaw v. Reno188 offers an example of equal protection’s differentia-
tion norms.  There the Court determined that plaintiffs could bring 
an equal protection claim against a state redistricting plan that ap-
peared to effectuate a racial gerrymander by combining minority vot-
ers who resided in different parts of the state into “unusually shaped,” 
majority-minority districts.189  Expressing skepticism that voters who 
were “otherwise widely separated by geographical and political 
boundaries”190 shared sufficient interests to justify being grouped in 
the same electoral district, the Court reasoned that the challenged 
redistricting plan could only be “rationally” understood as a state ef-
fort “to segregate races for purposes of voting.”191  The plan “rein-
force[d] the perception that members of the same racial group” 
shared the same viewpoints, political interests, and would “prefer the 
 
186 The anti-differentiation theory also operates, though somewhat differently, in the gender 
context.  It acknowledges that some stereotypes may be descriptively accurate, but are 
nonetheless constitutionally problematic because they limit opportunities for non-
conforming individuals within the group.  Another theory of stereotypes rejects sex classi-
fications that promote notions of “legal, social, and economic inferiority.”  United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).  The Court also acknowledges stereotyping concerns 
regarding state recognition of groups which it perceives as conveying assumptions of infe-
riority.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (strik-
ing down a zoning ordinance that refused to grant a special use permit to group home 
for people with mental disabilities). 
187 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
188 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
189 See also id. at 635–36 (observing that one district had been compared to a “Rorschach ink-
blot test” and that the second district stretched for 160 miles and wound “in snakelike 
fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas ‘until it 
gobble[d] in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods’” (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 
F.Supp. 461, 476–77 (E.D.N.C. 1992))). 
190 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. 
191 Id. at 642. 
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same candidates at the polls,” regardless of other distinguishing de-
mographic criteria, such as “age, education, economic status,” or 
their community of residence.192 
In other words, the Court’s premise in Shaw was that racial con-
siderations in redistricting obscured differences among individual 
voters.193  The Court regarded it as significant that the state legislature 
failed to track the state’s political geography and instead created dis-
tricts that brought together minority voters from different residential 
communities.194  The presumption was that minorities had more in 
common with their own geographically-defined communities than 
with other members of the same racial group who lived elsewhere.195  
The redistricting plan threatened constitutional harm because it pre-
sumed that race predominated over geography, the assumption being 
that choice of residential community was a more accurate reflection 
of individual political interests than race.196 
Similarly, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the 
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a voter initiative that 
amended the State of Michigan’s constitution to prohibit race-
conscious affirmative action in higher education admissions.197  Plain-
tiffs argued that the initiative singled out race-sensitive admissions 
policies for discriminatory treatment in the political process by selec-
tively removing them, and not other kinds of admissions decisions, 
from the purview of the state universities’ governing bodies.198  The 
contention was that the initiative racially distorted the state’s political 
process, effectively preventing racial minorities from securing policies 
that “inure[] primarily to [their] benefit” and that they “‘consider’ . . 
. to be . . . ‘in their interest.’”199  The Court rejected the proposed 
standard on the grounds that it would lead to a stereotyped assess-
 
192 Id. at 647; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Texas, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006) 
(noting the importance of intraracial differentiation in the redistricting context). 
193 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658. 
194 Id. at 647. 
195 For a critique of Shaw v. Reno, see Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:  
Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997). 
196 See Guinier, supra note 1, at 1603 (discussing the view that “geography approximates polit-
ical interests”). 
197 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014). 
198 Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 1–5, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No.12-682). 
199 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 
(1982)).  Justice Sotomayor echoed this point in her dissent.  See id. at 1651, 134 S.Ct. at 
1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Yet to know the history of our Nation is to understand 
its long and lamentable record of stymieing the right of racial minorities to participate in 
the political process.”). 
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ment of the kinds of policies that “benefited” racial minorities.200  
This was untenable because it presumed that racial minority groups 
shared similar, readily discernible interests and, therefore, failed to 
acknowledge the individuality of racial minorities.201 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1202 
offers another example of equal protection’s differentiation norms.  
There the Court struck down school district policies that used racial 
classifications to achieve racial balance and diversity among the en-
rolled students.203  The Court rejected the policies on narrow tailor-
ing grounds.204  A crucial problem was the broad dimensions of the 
racial classifications themselves, which, in the case of one district, 
identified students as being “white” or “non-white” and, in the se-
cond, classified them as “black or ‘other.’”205  In a district that includ-
ed widely diverse student populations, the Court determined that 
these rough categorizations failed to capture the full spectrum of 
students’ racial identities206  Its premise—that race had been too 
bluntly utilized to align with each district’s diversity goals—suggests 
that more finely grained racial definitions could better satisfy their 
educational objectives.207  The recognition of people of color as indi-
viduals, rather than as members of a racial group, depended on em-
bracing the full spectrum of racial diversity, rather than relying on 
rough racial distinctions of “non-white” and “other.” 
As each of these cases indicates, the Court has struck down race-
conscious policies that obscure differences among individual mem-
bers of minority groups.  These cases support the constitutional 
premise of intraracial diversity, which by definition emphasizes the 
individuality of persons of color. 
 
200 Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J.) (“In cautioning against ‘impermissible racial stereotypes,’ this 
Court has rejected the assumption that ‘members of the same racial group—regardless of 
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, 
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’” 
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993))).  
201 Id. 
202 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
203 Id. at 709–11. 
204 The Court did not reach the question of whether diversity itself is a compelling state in-
terest in the context of K-12 education.  Id. at 726. 
205 Id. at 727. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 723–24 (“Even when it comes to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion 
of diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/‘other’ 
terms in Jefferson County.” (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  See also Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S. at 610 (“We 
are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities 
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals.”). 
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C.  Racial Recognition & Identity 
The previous subparts discussed differentiation norms in equal 
protection.  Drawing on these cases, I have suggested that public uni-
versities may constitutionally take differences among individual 
members of racial minority groups into account in their admissions 
policies.  But these cases also raise a separate problem with the plain-
tiff’s theory in Fisher.  Prohibiting the consideration of race as a sup-
plemental, individualized component of critical mass requires the 
state to disregard the role that race may have played in shaping the 
lives of applicants.  In the name of protecting individuality, “color-
blindness” paradoxically commands the state to overlook an im-
portant element of an applicant’s identity and personhood.208  In-
deed, the University of Texas admissions policy was calibrated for this 
purpose.  It allows race to be factored into the overall assessment of 
the candidate if it is demonstrably meaningful to her lived experi-
ence.209 
Thus, barring racial considerations in higher education admis-
sions—effectively erasing race—threatens to undermine individuality 
in a way that tramples core equal protection concerns.210  Efforts to 
erase race—to pretend that it does not exist under the guise of 
“colorblindness”—can actually undermine the full expression of per-
sonhood.211  Requiring the state to ignore race in a context in which it 
is individually meaningful denies persons of color the opportunity to 
explore in their application racially-associated experiences that com-
prise an important element of their identity.212  Allowing the state to 
pursue diversity, but not diversity within underrepresented racial 
groups, sends the message that individuality matters for white stu-
dents but not for racial minorities.213 
 
 
208 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (noting the “stark reality that race matters”). 
209 See Joint Appendix at 168a–70a, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 11-
345), available  at  http://www.utexas.edu /vp/irla/Documents/Joint%20Appendix.pdf  
(reproducing a segment of a deposition, in which the deponent explained contextualized 
consideration of race). 
210 See Carbado & Harris, supra note 48, at 1147–48 (contending that “colorblind admissions 
regimes” are “likely to be particularly costly to applicants for whom race is a central part 
of their social experience and sense of identity”). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 See supra Part III.B.1 (identifying a hidden presumption of intraracial diversity for white 
students). 
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IV.  LESSONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION 
Equal protection has long embraced a rubric of “colorblind” indi-
vidualism,214 which presumes that state recognition of racial groups 
leads to racial stereotyping, stigma and balkanization.215  Social sci-
ence reveals that these assumptions are not only mistaken but, para-
doxically, can produce the very racial dynamics that equal protection 
condemns.216  Contrary to the assumptions of “colorblindness,” 
groups and individual identity are linked.217  As discussed earlier, en-
hancing the size of a minority group in an institution can create posi-
tive racial synergies that improve the health of the institution itself.218  
Enlarging the size of the minority presence also fosters the individual 
development of persons of color by alleviating the salience of race in 
ways that free racial minorities to explore their individuality.219  This 
in turn creates conditions that lessen racial stigma, stereotyping, and 
the social harms of tokenism.220  Further, contrary to assumptions that 
racial classifications lead to group balkanization, critical mass in-
creases the opportunity for healthy cross-racial interactions that build 
respect, mutuality, and reciprocity between persons from different 
racial backgrounds.221 
The lesson here, therefore, is that for equal protection to be faith-
ful to its professed goals of individualism, it should continue to per-
mit racial classifications that foster diverse institutional settings 
through critical mass.  By bolstering the depth and breadth of racial 
diversity, institutions enhance the opportunity for positive intergroup 
contact and for ameliorating racial stereotypes that retard individual 
opportunity and development.222  Creating such an environment, 
however, necessarily requires explicit attention to building a healthy 
group presence of racial minorities and attending to the conditions 
 
214 See supra Part I. 
215 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (observing that 
“classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm”); id. at 494 
(“[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain 
groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having 
no relation to individual worth.” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
298 (1978))); see also Siegel, supra note 29, at 1278 (identifying an “antibalkanization per-
spective” on equal protection that condemns uses of race perceived to “threat[en] social 
cohesion”). 
216 See supra Part II. 
217 See supra Part II. 
218 See supra Part II. 
219 See supra Part II. 
220 See supra Part II. 
221 See supra Part II. 
222 See supra Part II. 
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of that setting, which in turn requires explicit attention to race it-
self.223  This raises important questions about how to operationalize 
critical mass and—more particularly in light of Fisher—how to pursue 
critical mass through intraracial diversity.  I turn to this last point 
now. 
Devon Carbado224 and Vinay Harpalani,225 who both support the 
constitutional premise of intraracial diversity, have explored ques-
tions about its implementation, though they differ in some of the 
particulars in important respects.  Harpalani, for example, proposes a 
“unique contribution to diversity” test, which would require universi-
ties to identify how their race-conscious selection policies improve the 
representation of certain minority groups and/or enhance diversity 
within those groups,226 such as by increasing the “socioeconomic, cul-
tural, or geographic diversity among Black and Latino students.”227  
This is a sensible approach, though I would not require universities to 
demonstrate that they have in fact achieved “sufficient diversity of 
viewpoints . . . within each racial group,” as Harpalani at times ap-
pears to suggest.228  In my view, universities need only show that their 
policies seek to admit students of color with a range of different ex-
periences and that these policies are narrowly tailored to their goals.  
For example, a university might conclude that an African-American 
student who attended an inner city high school brings a different ex-
perience than a student who graduated from a predominantly white 
high school in the suburbs.  Depending on the profile of the students 
who have already been admitted, a university might properly con-
 
223 See, e.g., Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621–22 (discussing how “colorblind” poli-
cies increase the perception of social threat in corporate institutions with low minority 
representation). 
224 See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1164. 
225 See Harpalani, supra note 18, at 477 (observing that “within-group variation actualizes the 
educational benefits of diversity, as it serves to break down racial stereotypes . . . .”). 
226 Id. at 524–25. 
227 Id. at 525. 
228 Id. at 494; see also id. at 470 (urging universities “to demonstrate explicitly that [their] 
race-conscious policy is used to increase the variety of viewpoints and experiences among 
minority students—by admitting minority students in different majors, or from different 
cultural or socioeconomic backgrounds . . . .”); id. at 473 (defining critical mass to “re-
fer[] to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within racial groups”).  One potential 
problem with requiring a showing of viewpoint diversity is that viewpoint testing runs per-
ilously close to trenching on First Amendment concerns.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992) (describing the constitutional impermissibility of viewpoint testing under 
the First Amendment). 
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clude that one adds to intraracial diversity more than the other.  In 
fact, Justice Powell endorsed such an approach in Bakke.229 
Carbado properly cautions against adopting a framework that may 
incentivize admissions officers to judge applicants of color according 
to how well they conform (or don’t conform) to stereotypical charac-
teristics and behaviors most associated with their race.230  This means 
that universities should avoid devising admissions systems that “trade 
on biases and stereotypes.”231  To return to my earlier example of the 
African-American students who attended two different kinds of 
schools, admissions officers under my formulation could constitu-
tionally take their different experiences into account in evaluating 
their applications.  But it would cross the line to make admissions de-
cisions based, for example, on whether a particular student is more 
(or less) “authentically black.”  The constitutional problem here is 
that such a judgment rests on racial stereotypes about how blacks 
“are” or are “supposed” to be:  it confines the universe of “blackness” 
to people who conform to a predetermined set of characteristics or 
behaviors and rejects (or accepts) those based on whether they devi-
ate from the identified racial archetype.  No such problem occurs, 
however, where an admissions officer decides to admit an African-
American student based on the uniqueness of her experiences or 
background.  This judgment, of course, involves some assessment of 
why she is different, which in turn depends on some understanding of 
commonalities among African Americans as a group.  But it survives 
constitutional review because it does not depend on rigid, mechanis-
tic assumptions about African Americans in general.  Rather, it is 
based on an acknowledgement of individual differences among the 
racial group:  it opens the universe of “blackness” by acknowledging 
that black people can be and are, in relevant respects, different—not 
only from those who are not black, but also from each other. 
In his dissent from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent ma-
jority opinion in Fisher, Judge Garza missed this point, contending 
that the University of Texas’s policy to promote intraracial diversity 
 
229 Indeed, this is the approach that Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke.  See Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 321–24 (1978). 
230 See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1135, 1158 (asking whether decisionmaking processes that 
promote intraracial diversity are “normatively desirable” and contending that an “in-
tragroup differentiation dynamic” in the admissions context can lead to judgments about 
whether African Americans are “stereotypically black”); cf. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU 
GULATI, ACTING WHITE?  RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1–2 (2013) (ex-
ploring how employees manage and “perform” racial identity to conform to and to dis-
confirm racial stereotypes). 
231 See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1158. 
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itself depended on racial stereotypes.232  Garza argued that minority 
students admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law were regarded by 
the University as “somehow more homogenous, less dynamic, and 
more undesirably stereotypical than those admitted under holistic re-
view.”233  This argument, however, tracks the misguided premise of 
colorblind individualism, which ignores once again the reality and 
relevance of the lived experiences of race.  There are two responses 
to the Fisher dissent, both of which justify the University’s approach.  
The first is that the educational environment of segregated schools is 
different than the environment of integrated schools, not invariably 
worse, but most certainly different in key respects.  Indeed, it is so 
fundamentally different that we have erected an entire body of con-
stitutional doctrine around the distinction.234  The second response, 
which is consistent with the first, is that minority students who attend 
racially segregated schools may very well have experiences that are 
similar to minority students who attend integrated schools and vice 
versa.  Indeed, as already discussed, learning about such shared expe-
riences is an important part of the university experience.  But of 
course these students will never have the opportunity to realize their 
commonality unless the university brings them together in the first 
place.  And once it does, these students might well come to appreci-
ate their shared individuality within the broader context of society’s 
racial architecture. 
This leaves us with the constitutional question of how to deter-
mine when critical mass has been achieved and race-conscious admis-
sions are no longer needed.235  Given the vagaries of human nature, it 
is impossible to engineer human relationships completely.  This 
means that an institution likely would have a hard time determining 
the size of the minority population that is required to achieve critical 
mass without some trial and error.236  Rather, it would have to evalu-
ate and monitor the quantity and quality of diverse interactions on 
campus, in addition to creating social structures that facilitate such 
 
232 758 F.3d 633, 669–70 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
233 Id. 
234 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 
(1991); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
235 See Carbado, supra note 18 (discussing constitutional questions associated with “critical 
mass”); Harpalani, supra note 18 (discussing the same). 
236 Cf. Harpalani, supra note 18, at 484 (observing that the “educational benefits of diversi-
ty . . . may vary based on local history, demographics, and politics, or the institution’s his-
tory and educational mission, all of which can also change over time”). 
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interactions.237  Through careful observation, a university might de-
termine that a certain range of racial minority students is more likely 
to achieve a critical mass in its particular environment,238 though that 
range may change over time with demographic shifts and changes in 
the profile of the institution’s student population.  Once the number 
of students falls within this range,239 the university might cease to con-
sider race in admissions for that cycle.  Importantly, this does not 
mean that it would necessarily cease to admit minority students; it 
would only limit the number of students who could be admitted un-
der a race-conscious process for purposes of achieving critical mass.240 
Properly conceived and implemented, therefore, critical mass can 
take account of relevant differences within underrepresented minori-
ty groups, but not in a way that depends on racial typecasting.  Once 
again, the goal is to permit institutions to acknowledge race as part of 
an individual’s identity, if the applicant’s life experiences and cir-
cumstances so indicate.  The objective is to create an environment 
that both recognizes and cultivates the individuality of persons of 
color, just as it does for white students.  Failure to do otherwise is in-
consistent with equal protection’s normative framework. 
CONCLUSION 
 Equal protection advances principles of colorblind individualism, 
but social science points to race as a lived reality.  Although the state 
may ignore race, it cannot make race go away; and doing so, in fact, is 
likely to make race relations worse.  Given these outcomes, colorblind 
state action is never fully “race neutral” and colorblindness may in 
fact be color-consequential.  Social science reliably indicates that in-
creasing the size of the minority population in an institution can 
ameliorate the effects of tokenism, stereotypes, and stigma.  There-
fore, the use of racial classifications to build a healthy minority pres-
ence paradoxically diminishes the salience of race.  It promotes the 
individuality of persons of color and, accordingly, is more consonant 
with the objectives of equal protection. 
 
237 See Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1234–44 (noting the importance of carefully 
managing interactions among a diverse groups of students). 
238 See Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 
133–34 (2007) (observing that the creation of “critical mass” depends on empirical obser-
vation of the student body and their interactions in a unique institutional context). 
239 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003) (observing that “a range is inconsistent 
with a quota”). 
240 See id. at 342 (observing that narrow tailoring requires periodic review to determine con-
tinued necessity of race-conscious selection process). 
